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HOUSING-MARKET DISCRIMINATION AND BLACK
HOUSING CONSUMPTION
1.INTRODUCTION
There are several competing hypotheses which seek to explain the
concentration of blacks in certain portions of the city and their occupancy
of older, lower-quality housing. Blacks may consume less housing because
they are poorer, because they have different tastes, or because they
are discriminated against in the marketplace.
At one extreme, analysts have assumed the existence of a perfect
housing market. Under this assumption, differences in black and white
housing consumption are attributed to socioeconomic differences. Blacks
are poorer than whites. The dramatically lower levels of financial savings
by blacks reduce the liklihood that they can make a down payment.
In addition, lower levels of financial net worth for black families increase
the risk to mortgage lenders Moreover, the black population has a higher
percentage of single and separated households and female-headed house-
holds. These types of households consume less housing than married
households at any given income level. Also, black tastes are often
hypothesized to be different, blacks purportedly preferring to acquire
less housing at any income level than whites. Finally, segregation may
be self-imposed, blacks preferring to live among blacks.
Under the above assumptions, the existence of older, lower-quality
housing in the core provides housing most suitable for the majority
of the black population—particularly for separated households, those
with very large families, and those with lower incomes.. Self-segregation
is adduced to explain the fact that middle- and upper-income blacks
congregate in the core area.1
1.RichardMuth, Cities and Housing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1969), pp. 237-40, 284-303.
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The alternative viewpoint would recognize the role of income
differences and the different composition of black households by life-cycle
group but would stress the imp9rtance of racial discrimination in housing
markets. According to this view, the major explanation for housing
patterns is that blacks have become discouraged from entering higher-
quality suburban markets by the high prices which they confront, by
the high costs of search, and by the high noneconomic costs arising
from individual and community harassment. The concentration of blacks
in central ghettos is largely attributed to the white preference for a
segregated market, with suburban and certain central submarkets effec-
tively closed to blacks through discriminatory practices which discourage
black entry.2
It is difficult to refute the self-segregation thesis—namely, that
blacks' desire to live among blacks makes middle- and upper-income
blacks. willing to purchase lower-quality housing—though the author
believes it an implausible explanation for the large differences in housing
patterns which exist. There is no evidence that any large number of
blacks prefer segregated housing. Also, the price paid by blacks who
choose to remain cloistered in core ghettos is substantial. Employment
continues to decentralize, the quality of education in the core is inferior
to that in the suburbs, and the quality of urban life in terms of crime,
health, and the environment is much below that of the suburbs.
Perhaps the most convincing case that discrimination 'is important
in understanding the current scene lies in the growing body of qualitative
evidence describing the nature of discriminatoiy practices. Kain and
Quigley's forthcoming book provides a comprehensive review of this
literature.3 In brief, discrimination barriers remain despite steps taken
to eliminate discriminatory practices through legal restrictions or admin-
istrative procedures. Racial covenants in deeds have been struck down
by the courts, and stronger open-housing legislation has recenfly been
enacted. Nevertheless, it is hard to prohibit discrimination in individual
housing transactions, in either the sale or rental of units. As long as
large numbers of white households prefer a segregated market, discrimi-
nation in financing, in zoning decisions, by real estate agents, and by
individuals selling or renting is likely to persist.
In addition, the process of neighborhood tipping may add to the
2. John Kain, "Theories of Residential Location and Realities of Race," Harvard
Program on Regional and Urban Economics, Discussion Paper No. 47, June
1969; processed. Anthony Downs, Urban Problems and Prospects (Chicago:
Markham, 1970), pp. 75-114.
3. John F. Kain and John M. Quigley, Housing Markets and Racial Discrimi-
nation: A Microeconomic Analysis (New York: NBER, 1975), Chap. 3.118 DISCRIMINATION ANDBLACKHOUSING CONSUMPTION
entry barriers which blacks face. One important side effect of the tipping
process is that it encourages white residents to resist the first black
entrant, even though their preferences may be to live in a neighborhood
with some modest proportion of blacks. Sharp reductions in prices often
occur in the short run as neighborhoods tip. That these changes in prices
are often transitory is not a widely accepted proposition. Moreover,
what happens in the long run may assume little importance if white
households do not want to live in a neighborhood with a substantial
percentage, or a majority, of blacks. In these circumstances, the sharp
reductions in prices in the short run and the large associated transfers
in equity among neighborhood residents at different points in time assume
paramount importance in households' decisions. In the face of uncertain-
ty over what other neighborhood residents may do when the first black
family enters, white households all too often conclude they must be
the first to leave. Perhaps more important, as suggested above, white
households' perceptions of the process of neighborhood tipping reinforces
the tendency for communities to resist the first black entrant.
Little hard empirical evidence has been available to measure the
relative importance of socioeconomic differences versus market discrimi-
nation as explanations for the type and location of housing consumed
by blacks. Ex ante measures of the magnitude of discrimination barriers
in particular submarkets or affecting particular transactions are largely
unavailable. Interpreting ex post housing and location patterns is compli-
cated by the possibility that tastes for housing or choice of neighborhood
differs by race.
Quantitative analysis of the extent of discrimination has followed
two broad approaches. The first is to estimate the difference in prices
which black and white households pay for comparable housing. This
literature was summarized in Chapter 3. A major difficulty is that of
measurement; specifying comparable units and neighborhoods for
purposes of comparison is difficult if the market is highly segregated.
In addition, if discrimination is pervasive and the market is segregated
by race, the important comparisons are between the prices paid by the
majority of black households who remain in the black submarket and
white households with similar incomes and tastes. The experience in
the suburban housing market of the minority of all black households
who escape the ghetto may tell little about the extent or consequences
of discrimination. Price comparisons across racial submarkets were
presented above.
The second approach draws inferences about discrimination from
indirect evidence. Differences in housing consumption between blacks
and whites, independent of income and other life-cycle characteristics,
can be deduced by the analysis of variance. The race effect can beHOUSING DIFFERENCES ATFRIBUTABLE TO RACE 119
attributed either to discrimination or to differences in tastes.
This chapter extends the latter type of approach. As expected,
stratification of households by race, income, and life cycle reveals a
large race effect in housing consumption. A model of black housing
choice and housing demands permits a separation of the effects of income,
housing prices, and other supply-side differences. Black housing con-
sumption is related to income and housing prices and to location options
open to blacks in San Francisco. As has been noted, entry barriers
facing blacks have created substantially different housing markets for
blacks and whites. The estimates reveal that much of the race effect
can be explained in terms of blacks' responses to higher prices and
to the confinement to a ghetto submarket location., The residual dif-
ferences in housing consumption between whites and blacks attributable
to differences in tastes (i.e., for constant incomes and prices) prove
to be quite small empirically.
2.HOUSING DIFFERENCES ATTRIBUTABLE TO RACE
The evidence that there are significant racial differences in housing
(consumption and location) independent of income is becoming increas-
ingly persuasive. Kain has been the principal investigator developing
this evidence. His examination of individual-household interview data
collected for transportation studies of Detroit and Chicago provided
the first systematic evidence that neither work site nor income could
explain the differences in black and white residential location choices.
That data revealed that black residences were concentrated in downtown
ghettos, which entailed "reverse commuting" for a significant number
of blacks. Whereas the classical model of household location dictated
that a household would commute outward from an employee's place
of work, down the rent gradient, Kain found that significant numbers
of blacks working outside the central city commuted up the rent gradient
to central locations.4 Kain's explanation was that entry to suburban
markets was closed to them.
More recently, Kain has extended these comparisons of black and
white residential locations to many cities. These comparisons reveal
that, even after classifying by income, the percent of blacks and whites
living outside the central cities in 1960 was dramatically different. The
differences in location choice by blacks versus whites is striking—espe-
4. John Kain, "The Commuting and Residential Decisions of Central Business
District Workers," in Transportation Economics (New York: NBER, 1965),
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daily as regards high-income blacks, who, unlike whites, remain inside
central cities. In New York, only 8.2 percent of blacks with incomes
below $3,000 in 1960 lived outside the central city; but for blacks with
incomes over $10,000, the figure rises only to 13.9 percent. (Comparable
figures for whites were 16.3 percent and 39.2 percent.) Most of the
older northern cities exhibit a similar pattern. In San Francisco, the
percentage of blacks with incomes below $3,000 living in the suburbs
was 25.8 percent versus 31.5 percent for those blacks with incomes
in excess of $10,000. (Comparable figures for whites were 48.8 percent
and 60.8 percent.)5 These simple comparisons provide convincing evi-
dence that income alone cannot explain the differences between blacks'
and whites' residential location choices.
Kain and Quigley also find a dramatic difference in home ownership
rates between blacks and whites, adjusting for income and family-size
differences. They computed the expected level of home ownership for
blacks in eighteen cities in 1960 by a weighted sum of the individual
probabilities of ownership by income and family-size class, based on
the assumption that the likelihood of ownership for blacks in each class
was the same as for whites so classified in that city. Actual black ownership
rates proved to be dramatically lower. A cross-section regression of
the differences between predicted and actual ownership levels in these
eighteen cities revealed that the differences were largest in cities with
the highest percentage of blacks living in the central core, and in cities
with a high proportion of multifamily units in the central-city stock.
Kain and Quigley conclude that a major consequence of blacks being
excluded from suburban areas in which there is more single-family housing
available is the reduction of home ownership among blacks.6
This finding is corroborated in a separate analysis of the differences
in the probability of ownership between blacks and whites using a
household interview survey from St. Louis. Regressing the probability
of home ownership on income, education, employment status, and
life-cycle differences, they find significant differences in the probability
of ownership according to race. The race coefficient indicates that black
households have a probability of ownership .09 less than whites. Repeating
the analysis of tenure choice for that subset of households who are
•moving reveals a race coefficient of .12; including prior tenure in the
equation for movers yields a race coefficient of .09. Using the same
5. John Kain, "Theories of Residential Location," p. 5.
6. John Kain and John Quigley, "Housing Market Discrimination, Home Owner-
ship, and Savings Behavior," American Economic Review (June 1972), pp.
•263-77.
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technique of cross-section regression analysis, Kain and Quigley also
find significant differences between blacks and whites in St. Louis in
dwelling-unit type, dwelling-unit condition, and neighborhood charac-
teristics, holding income, life cycle, and education constant.8 While no
price variables or other measures of discrimination are included in the
analysis, the authors conclude that supply restrictions and entry barriers
confronting blacks provide the principal explanations for the race dif-
ferences.
Data for the San Francisco Bay Area housing market also reveal
a large race effect. Comparisons of housing consumption across house-
TABLE 5.1
PROBABILITY OF HOME OWNERSHIP BY INCOME AND RACE
Life-Cycle Class Income Black White


















































































aSample size less than ten.
bEquality of means for blacks and whites can be rejected at .05 level.
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7.1 4.1 a 2.6
Persons married, head














aSample size less than ten.
bEquality of means for blacks and whites can be rejected at .05 level.
holds classified by incme and life-cycle class reveal significant dif-
ferences in housing consumption attributable solely to race. Six life-cycle
classes were defined. The most heterogeneous is the classification "un-
married households," which includes both single individuals and persons
currently separated or divorced but without children present. The second
life-cycle group, "separated, with children," refers to married households
with only one parent in residence and children under fifteen present.HOUSING DIFFERENCES ATTRIBUTABLE TO RACE 125
This largely consists of broken families headed by a female, a classification
which includes 11.6 percent of all black households (versus 3.5 percent
for white households). Married households with both husband and wife
present were stratified according to age (below or about thirty-five)
and whether children were present. Four income classes were used.
Sample sizes prohibited any further breakdown by age or family size.
Black family composition includes a large number of "single" and
"separated" households: 34.6 percent af all black households fall into
this category versus 21.6 percent for whites.
Table 5.1 presents comparisons of home-ownership levels. This table
confirms the results of Kain and Quigley, namely, that blacks are less
likely to be owners. In addition, differences in the probability of ownership
accounted for by race are probably not invariant across income or
life-cycle groups; the biggest differences exist for the poorest blacks
in comparison with equally poor whites, for young black families with
children, and for separated households. While the difference in ownership
rates associated with race declines with income, a difference still persists
at the highest income levels—about 10 percent. Some of this may be
accounted for by the fact that the average black income in the open-ended
above $10,000 class is below the average for whites.
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 compare consumption of different housing-quality
attributes for renters and owners. The biggest difference between housing
consumed by black as against white renters lies in the condition of
the structure. Of blacks with incomes below $5,000, almost a third occupy
unsound units; for equally poor whites, the figure is only 13 percent.
At successively higher levels of income, the number of blacks who
occupy unsound units declines very sharply. Also noteworthy is the
fact that, among renters, higher-income blacks' choice of structure age
is not statistically different from the choice at lower income levels;
for whites, there is a significant reduction in the proportion who occupy
the oldest structure as income rises. As will be seen below, the income
elasticity for structure age for black families who are renters is insignif-
icant.
A somewhat different pattern is apparent for owners. Black owners
occupy lower-quality units than whites at every income level. Blacks
occupy more unsound units than whites, though the levels for owners
are below those for renters. With regard to structure age, higher-income
black owners occupy significantly newer units than poorer blacks. As
income rises, a reduction in the proportion of black owners who occupy
lots smaller than .2 acre is also apparent; the difference in lot size
between blacks and whites at each income level are marginally less
than the differences in structure age. However, differences by race
persist even for the highest income classification.126 DISCRIMINATION AND BLACK HOUSING CONSUMPTION
3.A MODEL OF BLACK HOUSING CONSUMPTION
The existence of discrimination and entry barriers implies that the
model for white households' choices developed and estimated in Chapter
4 is inappropriate for black households. As with whites, the optimal
location and amount of housing for any black household will depend
on its work-site location (or locations if mor than one member is
employed), differences in public services, taxes, and other neighborhood
characteristics, commuting time and costs, and prevailing housing prices
by submarket. In addition, the height of entry barriers, economic and
otherwise, will be important. Most black households have much less
latitude in altering their residential location than white households, owing
to the high price of black entry into many suburban neighborhoods.
The existence of substantial entry barriers to many neighborhoods
implies that work-site differences for black households assume much
less importance in explaining black households' housing consumption
than is the case with white households. Black households from a wide
range of work sites may commute to the same black submarkets. Thus,
while commuting time is relevant, travel time can hardly be included
as a continuous variable of choice in a utility maximization format as
can be done with white households. The length of the commuting trip
may therefore say less about preferences for trading off housing versus
commuting costs at the margin; instead commuting patterns for black
households probably reflect the location of employment opportunities,
black households' ability to gain access to particular suburban labor
markets, and the spatial characteristics of housing-market discrimination
barriers. The problem facing a black household might be better charac-
terized as a discrete programing problem, in which the household
compares the utility associated with the optimal bundle of housing services
if buying in one ghetto to the "solution" associated with purchase in
a few other black submarkets and in• a few isolated suburban markets
where entry may be possible.
The model of black housing consumption estimated below treats
the residential location choice as separable from the amount of housing
consumed. It is assumed that black households first choose a neighbor-
hood, then choose the amount and type of housing available, given
prevailing prices.
Of the several factors influencing black households' choice of any
particular suburban or ghetto location, the height of entry barriers in
each housing submarket appears to be the most important. The three
major black ghettos in the Bay Area each attract blacks with work
sites dispersed over a wide geographic area, suggesting that the price
of black entry into other neighborhoods is high. Unfortunately, thereMODEL OF BLACK HOUSING CONSUMPTION 127
are no measures of ex ante entry barriers by submarkets available, and
hence there is little basis for explaining why black households choose
one residential submarket over another. The role of income in black
households' choices can be analyzed. Increasing black incdmes have
generally been hypothesized to lead to black suburbanization. Higher-in-
come blacks may have more information and resources to conduct the
search, or more incentive to do so, especially since black preferences
for education and housing opportunities probably rise with income.
Higher-income blacks may also appear less threatening to whites and
hence face lower entry barriers. A simple test of the role of income
is presented below.
A more systematic analysis can be made of the type of housing
which black households consume. For such an analysis, the consumption
of different housing attributes is related to the household's income and
market options, as defined by prices in the area of residence and by
two submarket dummy variables indicating whether the residence site
can be characterized as belonging to the ghetto, to the mixed-racial,
or to the white submarket. A submarket refers to all neighborhoods
with a given racial composition and serves as a proxy for certain supply
conditions, as explained below. The ghetto submarket classification
includes all neighborhoods which were more than 60 percent black.
Mixed-racial submarkets include areas15 to 60 percent black; the
neighborhoods denoted by the mixed-racial submarket classification were
adjacent to a ghetto neighborhood in every case but one, a suburban
concentration of black households north of Oakland.
This specification presumes that the relevant prices at which blacks
may substitute housing for other goods, or one housing attribute for
another, are defined by prices in the area in which the black household
resides. These differences in choice of residential location are the source
of price variation, allowing estimation of the effect of prices in black
demand functions. (These prices are not work-site specific, since blacks
from many different work sites may live in one residential submarket.)
The housing attributes analyzed included choice of tenure, dwelling-
unit size, age of structure, and lot size in the case of owner units.
Age and lot size were represented in both continuous and discrete forms.
A logarithmic form was employed if the dependent variable was continu-
ous, and a semilog form was used if the dependent variable was a
zero-one dummy. (These nonlinear forms proved superior to linear
equations.) The dependent variables were:
Q1 =probabilityof ownership (1 if owner, 0 if renter);
Q2 =numberof rooms in dwelling unit;
Q3 =structureage (years);128 DISCRIMINATION AND BLACK HOUSING CONSUMPTION
Q4= Iif unit built prior to 1939, 0 otherwise;
Q5= Iif unit built 1960-65, 0 otherwise;
Q6= lotsize (acres);
Q7= 1if unit built on lot less than .2 acre, 0 otherwise.
Separate estimates were made for six life-cycle classes, as a means
of stratifying by tastes. Independent variables included income, two
submarket dummy variables, and a series of price variables—the price
of a composite bundle of housing characteristics and the incremental
price associated with several particular attributes.
Y =Income.
P0 =Priceof standardized unit—5.5 rooms, built since 1960, on
.2 to .3 acre lot, in sound condition.
R0 =Rentof standardized unit—4 rooms, built since 1960, in sound
condition.
R =Priceof additional room in owner and rental unit, respectively.
• P0 ,R0=Incrementalprice of a newer owner unit and newer rental
unit, respectively. Ratio of' price of standardized unit built
since 1960 to price of a standardized unit built in 1950-60.
P, R =Incrementalprice of a newer owner unit and rental unit,
respectively. Ratio of price of standardized unit built 1940-1950
to price of unit built before 1940.
P1 =Incrementalprice of large lot. Ratio of price of standardized
unit with lot .2 to .3 acre to price of standardized unit on,
lot <.2acre.
X1 =1if unit in ghetto, 0 otherwise.
X2 =1if unit in mixed-racial area, 0 otherwise.
The submarket classification dummies, which show that blacks in the
ghetto buy less housing—given their income and prevailing prices—than
blacks living in white submarkets, may reflect two factors subject to
very, different interpretations. One possibility is differences in tastes;
blacks who prefer to consume more housing at any given price have
an incentive to enter white submarkets. There is no information upon
which to estimate differences in tastes; however, any differences in
tastes independent of income and life cycle are likely to be small.
The other explanation arises from the existence of nonprice rationing
in black submarkets. If nonprice rationing is pervasive in the ghetto
and not in the suburbs (or vice versa), observed prices may be a poor
approximation of the options open to blacks wishing to substitute one
attribute for another. As has been previously noted, it appears that
at prevailing prices, there is excess demand for single-family units—espe-
cially better-quality units—in the ghetto and an excess supply of rentalMODEL OF BLACK HOUSING CONSUMPTION 129
units. The analysis of price differentials within black submarkets suggests
that nonprice rationing may be used to clear the market. Inclusion of
submarket classification dummies captures these differences in nonprice
rationing by submarket. This latter explanation for the significance of
the submarket dummy variables is the one which I support.
A.Results: Choice of Submarket
The causal relationships between employment location and residential
location choices for black households are complex. However, stratifica-
tion of black households by place of residence and place of work (see
Table 5.4) provides a summary picture of the effects of discrimination.
This stratification reveals a very different pattern for blacks than that
observed for whites.
Considering first all those black households residing in the several
ghetto submarkets, these black households are employed over a wide
TABLE 5.4
COMMUTINGPATTERNS: BLACK HOUSEHOLDS
A. Work Site Locations of HouseholdsClassified by Resi
Residence Site
dence Site
Oakland Oakland San Francisco
Work Site Ghetto #P Ghetto #2k' Ghettoc
Oakland ghetto #ia 66 34 0
Oakland ghetto #2" 18 31 0
All other locations in
Oakland County except a
and b above - 82 44 0
San Francisco ghettoc 14 13 24
All other locations in San
Francisco City except c
above 15 4 46
Suburbs to south of San
Franciscod 7 4 21
Total: 202 130 91
Subtotal: Number who
work outside
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TABLE 5.4Concluded
B. Residence Site Locations of Households Classified by Work Site
Work Site
Alameda Central Suburban Job Sites
and Business To SouthTo South
Central District of of
Residence Site Oakland San San Francisco" Oakland'
Oakland ghetto #1 a 40 27 4 10
Oakland ghetto #2b 21 12 2 7
Richmond mini.ghettoe 4 2 2 17
All other locations in
Oakland County except
Oakland ghettos 24 17 4 33
San Francisco ghetto' 0 47 21 0
All other locations in San
Francisco City 0 32 29 0
Total: 89 137 82 67
Subtotal: Residence
site outside
ghetto 24 49 33 33
aOakland, Tracts 0K8-0K24.
"Oakland, Tracts 0K46A-0K47B, 0K52-0K56, OK63A-0K69B.
cSan Francisco City, Tracts J1-J16.
'3San Mateo County.
eRichifiond City, Tracts 76-82.
Oakland, Tracts ALI-AL16B, 0K15-0K33.
8San Francisco, Tracts Al-A23, K1-K6.
hSan Francisco, Tracts M1-M9, 01-Ri, and San Mateo County.
'Contra Costa County, Tracts 1-92.
geographic area. Table 5.4revealsthat only 27.9 percent of black
households residing in the principal ghettos work where they reside;
another 20.5 percent work in other ghettos. (The fact that this latter
group of households do not move to the ghetto in which they work
probably reflects the costs of relocation.) The figures show that 51.6
percent work. outside the ghetto and commute in. Of this number, 49.8
percent commute up the rent surface, i.e. ,prices for older owner-occupied
housing in the work-site zone are below those in the ghetto residence
zone. This is a very conservative estimate of the extent to which blacks
are prohibited from taking advantage of (or Torgo) lower housing prices
in the suburbs, since outside the ghetto there are generally many additional
zones adjacent to or near black work sites where housing is availableMODEL OF BLACK HOUSING CONSUMPTION 131
at more favorable prices than in the ghetto. This estimate of the percentage
of black households who work outside the ghetto and in areas where
housing prices are cheaper much exceeds the percent of white households
who commute up the rent gradient. Again, this suggests that the choices
of black households are much more limited than those of white households.
Alternatively, examination of choices of blacks employed at a given
work site reveals the same pattern—a huge concentration of residence
sites in the ghettos. Of those blacks working in the central business
districts of Oakland and San Francisco, only 32.3 percent reside outside
the black ghettos. White households working in these same downtown
areas reside over a much wider geographic area. Of those black households
with a work site in selected suburbs of San Francisco or Oakland, 44.3
percent live outside the ghetto, a significantly higher percentage than
those with core-city job sites (the difference is significant at the 5 percent
level). With a single cross section, it is impossible to determine whether
these households first obtained a suburban job, then found a suburban
residence, or vice versa.
Only limited inferences can be made about the basis for black
households' choice of a white versus a black submarket. Table 5.5 presents
estimates of the likelihood of a black household residing in a white
submarket for six life-cycle classes. Only a limited number of black
households in this sample gained access to white suburbs: 35.4 percent
of blacks live in the ghetto, 23.6 percent in the ghetto boundary, and
40.0 percent in white submarkets.9 Blacks most likely to gain access
are married families with both spouses present (49 percent enter white
submarkets); in contrast, only 35 percent of black households of single
individuals or households made up of separated parents gainentry. There
is no means by which to determine whether these statistics reflect
differences in the level of entry barriers confronting the two groups
or different preferences for a white submarket—or both.
The effect of income can be treated more formally by relating the
probability of a black household residing in a white submarket to
household income. The data were first stratified into six life-cycle classes.
Income proved statistically significant for black married households with
children (see Table 5.5). The elasticity of a white submarket location
with respect to income is low, about .20. The fact that income is significant
for black families with children but not for other household classifications
9. The percentage of black households residing in the black submarket based
on the household-interview survey used in this study understates the extent
of racial concentration reported in the 1960 Census. The most likely explanation
is that the Bay Area household-interview survey undersampled households
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suggests that the quality of education is probably a primary consideration
in black households' decisions to seek a white submarket.
B.Results: Housing Consumption
The specification of the equations and the results for the life-cycle
class "married households with children and with the age of head over
35" are shown in Table 5.6. Estimates for other life-cycle groups appear
in Appendix B. For the probability-of-ownership equation, only the price
and the rent of a standardized bundle of services were included. In
equations for the other quality attributes of housing, the prices of the
several particular attributes were included—the incremental price of an
additional room, a newer unit, and a larger lot. This provides a test
for substitute or complementary relationships.
In the probability-of-ownership equation, income is significant, with
an elasticity of .421, but prices prove insignificant. The ghetto location
dummy is highly significant. Suburban blacks are both wealthier and
able to buy at prices relative to renting which are more favorable than
blacks who remain in the black submarkets. However, independent of
income and housing-price differences, black households are about 20
percent less likely to be owners if they live inside the ghetto than if
they live outside. The ghetto dummy reflects the nonprice rationing
arising from the shortage of owner units available to blacks.
In the case of dwelling-unit size, the estimated income elasticity
for blacks is low, about .10. There is also little evidence of a direct
price effect on space consumption. However, for both owners and renters,
the estimates suggest that dwelling-unit age is a complementary good
with size; the cross-price elasticity is generally significant, ranging from
—.10 to —.50across different life-cycle classes. The lot-size cross-price
elasticity proves insignificant. Finally, there are significant submarket
location effects for renters, with blacks confined to the ghetto and ghetto
boundary consuming less space. For owners, there is no significant
submarket location effect; the fact that owner-occupied units available
to blacks in the ghetto submarket are as spacious as those which blacks
buy outside reflects the large size of many of the older single-family
structures in the central portions of the city.
The structure-age equations for owners and renters are similar,
including both income and direct- and cross-price effects. In addition
to an equation treating dwelling unit age in years as a continuous variable,
two dichotomous variables were represented: the probability that the
structure chosen was pre-1939 and the probability that it was post-1960.
Both income and the price of the composite bundle of housing proved
statisticallysignificantinthestructure-age equations forowner-























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































m136 DISCRIMINATION AND BLACK HOUSING CONSUMPTION
Married households exhibit a higher price elasticity than single or
separated households. The incremental price of a newer unit or a larger
lot size were generally insignificant. The submarket location dummies
were significant; a ghetto location results in owner-occupants having
a structure which is 10.1 years older, holding income and housing prices
constant. Equations for the likelihood that a very old or a very new
unit is chosen also reveal the dramatic submarket location effect. The
likelihood that a black owner-occupant acquires a unit built since 1960
is about 25percentless if he lives in the black submarket; the likelihood
that the unit was built prior to 1939 is about 35percenthigher for
residents of the black submarket than for the same household buying
at the same price in the white submarket. (Other life-cycle groups exhibit
similar differences due to location.) Comparison of these equations for
structure age to those for whites (Table 4.3 and Appendix B, Table
B .3) reveals that black households' demands for structure age are less
price elastic than is the case for white households. This would account
for the larger price spread among units with different ages in the black
submarket than in the white submarket, as described in Chapter 3.
The demand equations for structure age for renters are based on
a larger sample and are generally a better statistical fit than the owner
equations. In contrast to black owners, the income variable for black
renters is either insignificant or exhibits a very low elasticity. Price
effects are very substantial, with both the price for the composite bundle
of services and the incremental price of a newer unit statistically
significant. The former exhibits an elasticity approaching or exceeding
one in most of the equations and across most life-cycle classes. The
decision to occupy the newest rental units exhibits especially high price
elasticities. The elasticity for the incremental price of a newer unit ranges
from —.5 to—1.0 for different life-cycle groups in the equation denoting
the decision to acquire the older units, and from —2.0 to —10.0 in the
equation denoting the decision to occupy the newest units. Thus, for
black renters, income does not seem to influence the choice of a structure
age, nor do blacks seem prepared to pay much of a premium for newer
rental units. The higher estimated price elasticities for age for black
households than for white households is consistent with the smaller
price spreads among rental units of different ages in the black submarket.
Finally, the submarket location dummies are again quite high. The
probability of occupying a rental unit built prior to 1939 is about 35
to 40 percent higher in the ghetto, and the probability of occupying
a unit built since 1960 is 10 percent lower. Again, these location dummies
reflect the available supply of rental units. Black renters who escape
from the ghetto much improve their likelihood of getting out of theIMPROVING BLACK HOUSING CONDITIONS 137
oldest units, though their chances of occupying the newest units are
not so significantly raised.
Estimates of the lot-size equations are less reliable than those for
age, tenure, or structure size. In part, this may reflect the fact that
blacks face severe constraints in acquiring any but the highest-density
units. The equation for the dichotomous variable denoting the choice
of the smallest lot is probably the most accurate specification. That
equation has a significant income term but the elasticity is generally
less than .15 (much below the income elasticity for white households).
The incremental price of a larger lot over the smallest lot is significant
for most of the life-cycle groups but displays elasticities below one.
Again, the submarket location dummies are highly significant.
4.IMPROVING BLACK HOUSING CONDITIONS
The demand estimates provide a basis for relating housing differen-
tials by race to differences in income between blacks and whites, housing
discrimination, and differences in tastes. Income and price effects can
be directly calculated, with the residual attributable to differences in
tastes. These estimates also reveal what might be expected from public
policies which eliminate income and market differentials.
The effect of income differentials between blacks and whites is
given by the predicted increase in housing consumption if black incomes
were increased to levels comparable with whites in the same life-cycle
class. For married households with children and the head over thirty-five,
black incomes in San Francisco in 1965 would have to be increased
from $8,610 to $11,450. This increase has a direct effect which is given
by the income coefficients. In addition, the higher income increases
by 3.5 percent the number of black households jn this life-cycle class
residing outside ghetto markets. These households buy at more favorable
prices and escape the nonprice rationing represented by the location
dummies. These changes are also included in the estimate of the income
effect.
•Predicting the effects of eliminating market discrimination by means
of the equations is more complex. The principal problem encountered
in estimating how much prices must be changed for blacks is that of
determining how much prices now differ for housing with the same
characteristics. Many attributes of the dwelling unit and of the neighbor-
hood are relevant in defining housing quality. In the analysis above,
dwelling units were described by their age, lot size, number of rooms,
and whether they were sound or unsound. In this study, no data is138 DISCRIMINATION ANDBLACKHOUSING CONSUMPTION
available on other dwelling-unit attributes. In determining "equal prices
for equal quality," only dwelling-unit quality was considered, using the
attributes listed above. While, in principle, neighborhood characteristics
are also relevant in defining "comparable" housing, no data permitting
standardization for neighborhood characteristics is currently available.
As has been noted, when standardized on the basis of the above
dwelling-unit attributes, housing in the ghetto exhibits prices which are
below prices of comparable units in contiguous central-city white submar-
kets, but which are often above the prices of such units in suburban
markets. The procedure used to measure equal prices for equal quality
was an adjustment of prices so that price/income ratios for each
dwelling-unit type in the black submarket were equal to the average levels
prevailing in the white submarket. (Due to differences in demand functions
and housing supplies across submarkets, such ratios exhibit variation
across different white neighborhoods, with higher price/income ratios
in central markets and lower ratios in the suburbs.) This criterion requires
that housing prices assumed to confront blacks be lowered by 16 percent
for newer owner units, 6 percent for older units, and 21 percent for
housing with the largest lots. Rents must be lowered by about 17 percent
for the newest units and 5 percent for older units.
Were data available, more sophisticated measures of price differences
would be desirable. For example, to the extent that ghetto units are
of lower quality because of the crudeness of the sound-unsound classi-
fication, the price effects estimated below understate the amount by
which prices must be reduced to achieve price equality. Neighborhood
differences may also exist, and hence comparability might imply additional
price changes. However, lot size, age, structure size, and the sound-un-
sound classification probably account for most of the important dimen-
sions of dwelling-unit quality. Despite these remaining measurement
problems in defining equal prices for equal quality, the above price
changes are a good approximation of the effects of eliminating price
discrimination.
A summary of the estimated consequences of these income transfers
and changes in prices to blacks are shown in Table 5.7. Increasing black
incomes to levels comparable with whites in this life-cycle class would
only reduce the gap between black and white housing consumption by
10 to 20 percent, depending on the attribute of housing considered.
In contrast, changing prices confronting blacks has a significant
impact. Dwelling-unit size would increase by .18 rooms, or by over
one-third of the gap between blacks and whites; and average age of
owner-occupant housing demanded would be reduced by 2.47 years,
which constitutes about 30 percent of the gap between blacks and whites.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0140 DISCRIMINATIONAN]) BLACK HOUSING CONSUMPTION
total gap. Rental units consumed would also be of higher quality. Equally
large changes in black housing consumption are associated with eliminat-
ing the submarket dummy variables. While the dummy variable may
reflect differences in tastes, this effect is slight, since the major determin-
ants of housing tastes—such life-cycle characteristics as marital status,
age of head, and the presence of children—have been accounted for.
The dummies are more likely to reflect supply rationing. A huge increase
in the probability of ownership is predicted by eliminating the submarket
location dummies. In addition, newer, lower-density housing would be
occupied.
The price effects, together with that (unspecified) portion of the
submarket dummy-variable effect attributable to supply rationing,provide
an estimate of the effects of making market opportunities facing blacks
comparable to those open to whites. This factor has a substantially
greater potential effect on housing consumption than the results of
equalizing black and white incomes. Taken together, these changes in
income and market opportunities account for most of the gap between
blacks and whites in the several measures of housing consumption. This
implies that differences between blacks and whites in tastes for housing
are clearly' of limited importance in explaining racial differentials in
housing consumption. (There are, of course, differences in tastes among
white households or among black households which remain unexplained
by the demand equations!) The one possible exception is lot size, where
significant differences between blacks and whites would persist even
with equal incomes and prices. However, the income and price elasticities
in the estimated demand equations for lot size have low levels of
significance, and hence any conclusion about differences between blacks
and whites in tastes for lot size must be considered highly tentative.
5.CONCLUSIONS
The evidence that differences in income alone will not account for
the observed differences between black and white housing consumption
is quite persuasive. Examination of the data for San Francisco reveals
large differentials between blacks and whites which persist even for
those comparisons involving the highest-income households.
The explanation for differentials such as these lies largely in entry
constraints, which limit the supply of housing available to blacks. While
no ex ante measures of discrimination barriers are available, their effects
on housing prices and the supplies available to blacks can be measured
and are dramatic. The majority of blackhouseholds in the San Francisco
Bay Area reside in three small geographic areas which contain the oldest,CONCLUSIONS 141
highest-density housing stock. A minority of blacks, predominantly
middle- and upper-income, enter white submarkets. These fortunate few
consume substantially better housing. However, the much larger number
of middle- and upper-income black households confined to black submar-
kets fare much worse; the model shows their housing consumption re-
duced by higher prices and by nonprice rationing of better-quality housing.
Virtually all of the observed differentials in housing consumption attri-
butable to race can be traced to these market imperfections. By compari-
son, differences in tastes between blacks and whites appear relatively
insignificant.
This chapter also suggests that increases in black incomes alone,
through conscious public policy or by other means, will not eliminate
the gap between black and white housing consumption. The summary
statistics for the 1960s revealing the limited number of black households
obtaining access to the suburbs are highly suggestive. Based on the
more detailed cross-section analysis here, only small numbers of blacks
can be expected to enter white submarkets, even with dramatic increases
in income.
Unless more housing is made available to blacks, the primary result
of rising incomes may be price increases, with the captive demand in
the black housing market bidding up prices of better-quality housing.
In short, in the context of a continued segregated market of the type
prevailing in the Bay Area in 1965, increases in black family incomes
will not solve blacks' housing problems. This circumstance provides
strong support for an open-housing policy, a conclusion only further
emphasized by the likelihood that the San Francisco housing market
is less discriminatory than that of most other major urban areas.